We discuss recent work generalising the basic hybrid logic with the difference modality to any reasonable notion of transition. This applies equally to both subrelational transitions such as monotone neighbourhood frames or selection function models as well as those with more structure such as Markov chains and alternating temporal frames. We provide a generic canonical cut-free sequent system and a terminating proof-search strategy for the fragment without the difference modality but including the global modality.
Introduction
Recently, terminating tableaux and sequent calculi have been presented for the basic hybrid language with the global modality [3, 2] and also the difference modality [13] . In such systems a saturated branch may be used to construct a model, for example by using the branch to construct a 'nominal tree' that represents a successor relation between nominals and then quotienting that tree by equivalent nominals to obtain a graph.
The results mentioned above are based on extensions of the modal logic K with various features, such as the difference modality or satisfaction operators. On the other hand, there are many more modal logics that one may want to enrich with hybrid features, for instance probabilistic or graded modal logics. In this paper, we explore to what extent the tools and techniques used to establish completeness, cut-elimination and termination for hybrid tableaux generalise to modal logics that are not interpreted with respect to relational semantics.
Rather than answering this question on a case-by-case basis, we work in a more general (coalgebraic) setting in which many (mostly non-normal) modal logics find their natural place. The main idea behind the coalgebraic framework is to isolate the notion of transition. In a relational framework, a transition from a particular world is determined by the set of its successors. Similarly, when working with quantitative uncertainty, each state gives rise to a probability distribution over the entire state space, in monotone modal logic, we have a set of monotone neighbourhoods, and the semantics of conditional logics can be expressed by assigning selection functions to worlds.
It is fair to say that across this breadth of modal logics, hybrid extensions have only been considered for those logics that can be interpreted with respect to relational semantics (with the exception of [11] where hybrid extensions of probabilistic logics are considered, and our own work [15] that neither covers the global nor the difference modality). In particular, graded hybrid logic is by now well understood, both from the perspective of modal logic [12] and description logic [6] . As an illustration of the approach taken here, our semantics of graded logics arises not via Kripke structures (where successors are counted) but via multigraphs: transitions are determined by multisets of successors (which induces the same satisfiability problem, but is stable under bisimulations): we will come back to this point later.
In general, the coalgebraic approach to modal logics takes the idea of structured transitions as primitive: models have the shape S → T S where T is an unspecified notion of transition. To capture the examples above, we may take T S to be the set of all subsets of S (for relational semantics), the set of all probability distributions over S (for probabilistic modal logics), the set of all monotone neighbourhoods (monotone modal logic) or indeed the set of all selection functions on S (to interpret conditional logics). Crucially, all those notions of transition support a notion of both embeddings (or substructures) and quotients. On a more abstract level, this manifests itself in the fact that we can apply the construction T not only to sets, but also to functions in a meanigful way: if f : A → B is a function, so is T f : T A → T B. If, for example, T S = P(S) is the set of all subsets of S, and f : A → B, we have that T f : T A → T B is direct image, i.e. T f (a) = {f (x) | x ∈ a}. In other words, we actually have that T is not only a construction on sets, but in fact an endofunctor. Transition structures or coalgebras are then functions γ : S → T S and the usual modal logic notions of polyadic modal operators, p-morphisms, generated submodels, bisimulations and so forth all arise naturally as definitions parametric in the transition type T [8, 22] .
The idea of the coalgebraic approach to (modal) logics is now to assume that the semantics of a modal logics is given with respect to an endofunctor T , without ever being explicit about how T is given concretely. As a consequence, all results established in the coalgebraic framework simultaneously apply to a large number of structurally different modal logics. Given such an endofunctor T , its coalgebras S σ −→ T S play the role of frames. On the syntactical side, we fix a set of modal operators that can be interpreted with respect to T -coalgebras, and the study of coalgebraic modal logics now boils down to extracting suitable coherence conditions between the syntax and the (coalgebraic) semantics that ensure properties such as soundness, completeness or decidability.
In this paper, we study the effects of adding hybrid features and the difference modality to a modal logic equipped with coalgebraic semantics. Subject to suitable coherence conditions, the main results presented here are completeness of both a Hilbert-style and a sequent calculus with respect to the coalgebraic semantics. Crucially, the necessary coherence conditions are precisely the same conditions that are also needed to guarantee completeness of the underlying modal logic (without hybrid features) so that we have a large number of examples, including all those mentioned above, readily available. In addition to that, we show termination to the sequent calculus in absence of the difference modality and conclude with remarks concerning the compositionality of the coalgebraic framework, where we demonstrate how to synthesise a hybrid logic for multi-agent systems with probabilistic behaviour. Technically, we prove completeness by adapting Schröder's model construction [21] to the case of hybrid logics with the difference modality. We then construct a sound sequent calculus and prove its completeness by embedding the Hilbert-style proof system into the sequent calculus. Termination is then shown by adapting Bolander's technique [3, 2] : we view every application of a modal rule as generating relational successors and show termination by showing that this resulting nominal tree (that arises by recording which named states spawn new states) is in fact finite. By instantiating our general results to concrete examples, we of course re-prove completeness and termination for (standard) hybrid logics, but also for graded and probabilistic modal logic, for Pauly's Coalition Logic [20] , and monotone modal logic.
We start by recalling the necessary coalgebraic and logical preliminaries, then present a complete Hilbert system for hybrid coalgebraic logics. In the following section, we embed this system into a (sound, and cut-free) sequent system, giving rise to cut-elimination. The last section concerns compositionality of coalgebraic logics, and we exemplify how to derive a hybrid logic for games with probabilistic outcomes.
Preliminaries and Notation
Throughout the paper, we fix a modal similarity type Λ that consists of modal operators with arities, a set P of propositional variables and a set N of nominals. The set F(Λ) of Λ-formulas is given by the grammar
where p ∈ P, n ∈ N and each ♥ ∈ Λ is an n-ary modal operator. The global modality is defined Aψ = ¬E¬ψ and D = ¬D¬ is the dual of the difference modality. We use the standard definitions for the other propositional connectives →, ↔ and ∨. Briefly, nominals n denote individual states in a model, @ n φ stipulates that φ holds in the state that n names and Eφ holds at a state of a model M if φ is satisfiable in M . Finally, D is the difference modality and Dφ holds at a state if there exists a distinct state where φ holds.
If S is a set of formulas, we write Prop(S) for the set of propositional combinations of formulas in S. By a clause we always mean a disjunctive clause. We call a formula global if it is a propositional combination of formulas that are prefixed with @ or E. In other words, the set G(Λ) of global Λ-formulas is given by
The semantics of Λ-formulas is given with respect to Λ-structures that consist of an endofunctor T : Set → Set, defining the nature of the transitions, together with an associated n-ary predicate lifting ♥ for each n-ary modality ♥ ∈ Λ. Intuitively T defines the transition behaviour whereas Λ defines the modal operators we use to observe such transitions. An n-ary predicate lifting is a set-indexed family of functions ( ♥ X : P(X) n → P(T X)) X∈Set that satisfies the naturality condition
for all functions f : X → Y . For the categorically minded, each ♥ is a natural transformation of type Q n → Q • T op where Q : Set op → Set is the contravariant powerset functor. For any such predicate lifting ♥ we may consider its dual ♥, interpreted via
and it follows from this that ♥(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) arises syntactically as ¬♥(¬φ 1 , . . . , ¬φ n ) as usual, see the definition of the semantics below. We usually keep the definitions of the predicate liftings implicit and identify Λ-structures with the underlying endofunctor. However it is worth reiterating that we cover two degrees of freedom: both the transition structure T and our modal operators Λ may be varied.
The notion of a predicate lifting is the central definition in coalgebraic modal logic. There are two important points worth making at this juncture:
(i) The above definition of a predicate lifting arises naturally by requiring bisimilar states to have identical logical theories.
Take T = P so that T -coalgebras are Kripke frames. Using the standard definition, Pφ holds in a state x of some Kripke frame γ : X → PX iff its successor set γ(x) is a subset of the semantics φ ∈ PX of φ. In other words Pφ holds at x iff the transition at x i.e. γ(x) ∈ T X lies inside a particular subset s ⊆ T X of 'good' transitions, where s itself is determined by a subset S ⊆ X, namely φ .
More generally for any transition type T we may think of a unary modal operator ♥ as a family of functions ♥ X : PX → PT X which takes a predicate over X as input and provides a collection of good transitions as output. In any T -coalgebra γ : X → T X, we say ♥φ holds at x iff γ(x) lies in ♥ X (S) where S is the semantics of φ. The crucial property we require of these functions ♥ X is to guarantee invariance with respect to coalgebraic behavioural equivalence [16] , which specialises to the usual notion of bisimulation in the case of Kripke frames: if two states x, y of possibly different coalgebras are bisimilar then ♥φ holds at x iff ♥φ holds at y. One can show that this requirement is equivalent to the condition ♥ X • f −1 = (T f ) −1 • ♥ Y for all sets X, Y and functions f : X → Y . The more general n-ary definition above can be derived in a similar manner.
(ii) There is a bijection between the n-ary predicate liftings for T and the subsets of the set T (2 n ) where 2 = { , ⊥}. This bijection is an instance of the Yoneda lemma as observed in [22] .
Importantly this means we also have a really good grasp of what a coalgebraic modal operator for T actually is. For example P corresponds with the subset {∅, { }} of P2 whereas Q corresponds with {{ }, {⊥, }}, see [22] . We provide this bijection for the case n = 1.
Given any U ⊆ T 2, we define a unary predicate lifting ♥ U X :: PX → PT X as follows. Any S ⊆ X defines an indicator function 1 X S : X → 2, to which we may apply our functor T yielding a function T 1 X S : T X → T 2. Then ♥ U X (S) is defined as (T 1 X S ) −1 (U) i.e. we apply the inverse image of T 1 X S to U. One can check that the naturality condition
Conversely if ♥ is a unary predicate lifting for T then define U ⊆ T 2 as ♥ 2 ({ }). One can show these two operations between unary predicate liftings for T and subsets of T 2 form a bijection.
This characterisation of modal operators might seem rather restrictive, for example graded modalities do not arise as predicate liftings for T = P because e.g. ∃ >2 X (S) = {Y ∈ PX : |S ∩ Y | > 2} doesn't satisfy the naturality condition. Thus they are not admissible as coalgebraic modal operators for Kripke frames. However graded modalities do arise as predicate liftings if one endows the type of transition T with more structure, which is achieved by taking T to be the multiset functor so that T -coalgebras are multigraphs. This is a consequence of the fact that coalgebraic logics are bisimulation invariant, which is no longer the case for graded modalities. Roughly speaking, if a modality only talks about the behaviour over the next step then it should be axiomatisable exclusively using certain formulae known as rank-1 formulae [24] . Any such axiomatisation induces a functor in which the modal operator arises as a predicate lifting, see loc. cit. In this sense one can expect coalgebraic semantics to cover all such modalities, often by enriching the behaviour type, as for example the multigraph semantics of graded modal logic. Although there are plenty of modalities which can talk about behaviour more than one-step away, these are still essentially built out of coalgebraic modal operators. One might add fixpoints [14] or frame conditions [18] but the underlying 'one-step' coalgebraic modal operators always lurk beneath. We now define the coalgebraic semantics. Definition 2.1 Given an endofunctor T : Set → Set, a T -coalgebra is a pair (C, γ) where C is a set (of states, or worlds) and γ : C → T C is a (transition) function.
, hence the class of T -coalgebras forms a category. A Tmodel is a triple (C, γ, π) where (C, γ) is a T -coalgebra and π : P ∪ N → P(C) is a hybrid valuation, i.e. a mapping so that π(n) is a singleton set for all n ∈ N. If we assume that T extends to a Λ-structure, we interpret Λ-formulas over a T -model M = (C, γ, π) using the standard clauses for propositional connectives together with:
where φ M = {c ∈ C | (M, c) |= φ} is the truth-set of φ ∈ F(Λ). We say φ ∈ F(Λ) is valid and write |= φ if φ holds in every state of every T -model.
Example 2.2
(i) Coalgebras for the powerset functor P are Kripke frames γ : X → PX, mapping a state to the set of its successors. Given a function f : X → Y then Pf : PX → PY is simply the direct image of f . The parametric maps Q X (S) = {Y ⊆ X : S ∩ Y = ∅} and P (S) = {Y ⊆ X : Y ⊆ S} are indeed natural transformations from Q to Q • P op . In terms of PP2, Q corresponds with {{ }, {⊥, }} and P corresponds with {∅, { }}. The usual modal similarity type which is is Λ = {P}.
(ii) Coalgebras for the contravariant powerset functor composed with itself: Nbhd = Q • Q, are neighbourhood-frames. Given any function f :
Nbhd-coalgebras are maps γ : X → PPX. The neighbourhood box arises as the predicate lifting P X (S) = {N ∈ NbhdX : S ∈ N }.
(iii) Let Mon : Set → Set be the monotone-neighbourhood functor, which is the subfunctor of Nbhd with MonX = {N ∈ NbhdX : A ⊇ B ∈ N implies A ∈ N } i.e. the neighbourhoods that are upwards closed. For functions f : X → Y , Monf is the restriction of Nbhdf to MonX. Then Mon-coalgebras are monotone neighbourhood-frames and the neighbourhood box above restricts to these coalgebras.
(iv) Consider the covariant functor Cond : Set → Set with CondX := QX → PX so that →: Set op × Set → Set is the function space functor. On objects A → B consists of the functions from A to B and given functions f : Y → X and
Then Cond-coalgebras are selection function models in the sense of [4] and the binary modality · ⇒ · arises as the binary predicate lifting
(v) The subfunctor P 2 of P is defined P 2 X = {S ⊆ X : |S| ≤ 2}, given f : X → Y P 2 f is the restriction of the direct-image to P 2 X. P 2 -coalgebras are Kripke frames which have at most two successors. P and Q then arise as predicate liftings which are the restrictions of those defined on P.
(vi) Examples including coalitional games (or alternating temporal frames), Markov chains and multigraphs can be found in [25] . For some less well-traveled examples including the free band-monoid and the non-repetitive list functor see [22] ; also a general perspective which leads to many other examples can be found in [10] .
Complete Axiomatisation of Hybrid Coalgebraic Logic
In the previous section, we have introduced the semantics of coalgebraic hybrid logic with respect to arbitrary T -models. To match this generality on the level of axiomatisation, our treatment is parametric in a set of one-step rules that embodies the notion of transition represented by T . Intuitively, coalgebraic semantics assigns a transition γ(c) ∈ T C to every state c ∈ C of a coalgebra (C, γ). On the logical side, the relation between states and successors is embodied by one-step rules that allow us to infer properties of successor states in terms of properties of states. In fact every rank-1 formulae has an equivalent one-step rule and conversely [21] . With the view of using these rules both in a setting of Hilbert and Gentzen calculi, we adopt the following definition.
Definition 3.1 Let P be a countably infinite collection of propositional variables and given any set of formulae S let ¬S = {¬φ | φ ∈ S} and Λ(S) = {♥(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) : φ i ∈ S, ♥ ∈ Λ is n-ary}. A one-step rule over a similarity type Λ takes the form
where Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ⊆ P ∪ ¬P, Γ 0 ⊆ Λ(P) ∪ ¬Λ(P) and every propositional variable that occurs in the conclusion of a rule also occurs in the premise. Each Γ i is a set (rather than a multiset) that is represented by a comma separated list, understood as the disjunction of its elements.
We associate the following rules to the structures introduced in Example 2.2.
Example 3.2
(i) The following standard ruleset can be used to axiomatise Kripke frames:
(ii) We take the following ruleset for neighbourhood frames, note the box is now the neighbourhood box: ¬a, b a, ¬b ¬Pa, Pb (iii) For monotone neighbourhood frames we use the rules:
(iv) These one-step rules are the well-known ones for minimal selection function models:
(v) For P 2 -coalgebras, suppose the conclusion is ¬Pa 1 , . . . , ¬Pa n , Pb 1 , . . . , Pb m where n ≥ 0, m ≥ 1 and M = {1, . . . , m}. Then consider any U ⊂ PM such that for every subset S ⊆ M either S ∈ U or M \ S ∈ U but not both. For every such U = {S 1 , . . . , S k } there is a rule:
The rulesets for multigraphs and discrete Markov chains are more complex than those given above, see [25] .
We use one-step rules to capture those aspects of models that are specific to any concretely given Λ-structure. Deduction in coalgebraic hybrid logics is given relative to a set R of one-step rules, and mostly standard axioms that relate to nominals, the global modality and the difference modality.
Of the above axioms only (MobE i ) requires comment, the others being standard. One may view it either as a generalisation of the back-axiom Q@ i p → @ i p, the inclusion axiom Qp → Ep or in terms of the difference modality Qp → p ∨ Dp. It expresses the fact that if the formula Eφ holds in some state of a model then it must hold in all states. We require this axiom for every ♥ ∈ Λ.
With the help of the above axioms, the derivability predicate in coalgebraic hybrid logic relative to a set R of one-step rules is given as follows: The above axioms and rules (with the exception of MobE) are the same as for hybrid logic over Kripke frames [1, Chapter 7.3] . The main goal of this section is to establish soundness and completeness of coalgebraic hybrid logic with the difference modality, parametric in a Λ-structure T i.e. in the type of transition and also the modal observations we may make over them. This T appears logically as a set R of one-step rules which must in some sense be complete. The completeness condition that we need on the ruleset is identical to that which guarantees completeness in absence of hybrid features [25] . Intuitively speaking, these one-step rules allow us to propagate reasoning about states (the premises) to reasoning about successors (the conclusion). Later we will exhibit a very simple process one can use to 'hybridise' this ruleset for direct use in a sequent system. Definition 3.4 Suppose X is a set and τ : P → P(X) is a valuation of propositional variables. We write φ X,τ ⊆ X for the evaluation of a propositional formula φ in the boolean algebra PX under the valuation τ , and (X, τ ) |= φ if φ X,τ = X.
Similarly if ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(P)), the one-step semantics ψ T X,τ ⊆ T X of ψ relative to τ is the evaluation of ψ in the boolean algebra PT X via the inductive extension of the assignment:
to the whole of Prop(Λ(P)). We call ψ one-step valid relative to τ if ψ T X,τ = T X and write (T X, τ ) |= ψ in this case.
In fact the converse also holds.
(
To say that some ψ is one-step valid relative to τ : P → PX means that every transition t ∈ T X lies in the set ψ T X,τ . It follows by the coalgebraic semantics that for every coalgebra γ : X → T X, ψ holds in every state of the T -model (X, γ, τ ). However, we shall see that, due to the structure of predicate liftings, it is not the codomain PX of τ or the particular sets Q = {τ (p) : p occurs in ψ} that matters. Instead it is the relative boolean structure of the sets in Q which causes (T X, τ ) |= ψ. Understanding the boolean structure from which each one-step validity arises leads to an axiomatisation of the relevant notion of transition.
Notice in the above examples that we did not explicitly define the maps τ : P → PX. Instead the relationship between the sets τ (p) and τ (q) determined that ψ was one-step valid relative to τ . Such structure can be captured by a propositional formula, which in this case is ¬p ∨ q. Generally speaking, to say that ψ is one-step valid relative to τ means there is a certain propositional formula φ with propositional variables from ψ, which captures the structure of τ in the following sense:
So not only does φ evaluate to in the boolean subalgebra of PX generated by Q = {τ (p) : p occurs in ψ} but it also precisely captures the boolean structure that makes ψ one-step valid relative to τ . Let V consist of those finitely many propositional variables that occur in ψ, then define φ as the conjunction of all propositional clauses χ over V such that (X, τ ) |= χ. Such a φ = i χ i satisfies the properties (i) and (ii) above, as in proved in [21, Theorem 18] . We have just seen that any ψ one-step valid relative to τ induces a one-step rule which is one-step sound : Definition 3. 6 We say that a one-step rule Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 ∈ R is one-step sound if (X, τ ) |= Γ i for all i = 1, . . . , n implies that (T X, τ ) |= Γ 0 , for any valuation τ : P → PX. A set R of one-step rules is one-step sound if all of its rules are.
One says that ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(P)) is one-step derivable relative to τ : P → PX if the collection of clauses:
A ruleset R is one-step complete if for any valuation τ every one-step valid clause ψ relative to τ is one-step derivable relative to the τ . Moreover we say R is one-step cut-free complete if additionally there exists a single clause in S(X, τ ) which propositionally entails ψ. That is, R is one-step cut-free complete if there exists a single clause χ ∈ S(X, τ ) such that χ is a subclause of ψ.
Given R is one-step sound it follows that if ψ is one-step derivable relative to τ then it is also one-step valid relative to τ . One can now understand why the above concepts have been given these particular names: one-step soundness implies that one-step derivability implies one-step validity. In fact one-step sound one-step rules are sound, which allows us to prove the soundness of our derivability predicate R : Proposition 3.7 Suppose that R is a one-step sound set of one-step Λ-rules. Then |= φ whenever φ for all formulas φ ∈ F(Λ).
Proof. The soundness of all axioms and rules aside from R is standard. For any one-step rule Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 in R and substitution σ, assume for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that |= Γ i σ then we must show that |= Γ 0 σ follows from one-step soundness. In any
. . , φ n M )). Since γ −1 is a boolean morphism it follows that for any clause Γ 0 σ one has (M, c) |= Γ 0 σ iff c ∈ γ −1 ( Γ 0 T C,τ ) where τ (p) = σ(p) M . Our initial assumption implies that for every i in {1, . . . , n} (C, τ ) |= Γ i hence by one-step soundness Γ 0 T C,τ = T C, therefore Γ 0 σ holds globally. Since the model M was arbitrary Γ 0 σ is a valid formula. P One-step completeness of a ruleset is the converse of one-step soundness: every one-step validity is one-step derivable. It is the critical condition required to prove completeness with respect to our hybrid coalgebraic semantics.
Lemma 3.8 [21] For every T : Set → Set and set of predicate liftings Λ for T there exists a set of rules which is both one-step sound and one-step complete
The proof follows by showing that the set of all one-step sound rules is one-step complete. Hence the subsequent completeness proof, which relies upon one-step completeness works for all choices T and Λ, without explicitly providing the ruleset. In practice we have found that the relevant rulesets may be described in a compact manner e.g. all rulesets in Example 3.2 are one-step cut-free complete.
Although one-step completeness is sufficient for the completeness result that follows, we shall in fact assume one-step cut-free completeness at the crucial point in the completeness proof. This is not really an issue since it is always possible to close a one-step complete ruleset such that it is cut-free, see [17] . At any rate we will need this condition to obtain cut-freeness of our generic sequent system later.
We tackle completeness by modifying the finite model construction found in [21] . Since coalgebraic modal logics need not be compact (we may e.g. choose T X = {Y ⊆ X | Y finite} to interpret the modal logic K), we show completeness by constructing finite satisfying models from consistent formulae. As usual a formula φ ∈ F(Λ) is inconsistent iff R ¬φ, and consistent otherwise. For the remainder of the section we fix a consistent formula φ 0 ∈ F(Λ). For each Dχ i that occurs as a subformula of φ 0 we introduce a new nominal n i . We also introduce a new nominal t 0 . The extra nominals n i will be used in the truth lemma later where, for any maximally consistent set containing Dχ i we must obtain a distinct one containing χ i . The nominal t 0 will name the state where φ 0 holds. Definition 3.9 The closure of φ 0 denoted Σ(φ 0 ) contains the set S = {@ t 0 φ 0 } ∪ {n i : Dχ i a subformula of φ 0 } and is closed under subformulae (where n counts as a subformula of @ n φ), the propositional connectives ¬, ∧ and prefixing by E and @ n where n occurs as a subformula of S. We define G(φ 0 ) to consist of the global formulae that lie in Σ(φ 0 ) and let M G(φ 0 ) denote the maximally consistent subsets of G(φ 0 ).
Lemma 3.10 Σ(φ 0 ) is finite modulo logical equivalence
Proof. First note @-operators commute with propositional connectives and this, together with @ i Ep ↔ Ep and @ i @ j p ↔ @ j p, allows us to assume they prefix subformulae of S. Furthermore the theorems E(p ∨ q) ↔ Ep ∨ Eq as well as E(p∧Eq) ↔ Ep∧Eq and E(p∧¬Eq) ↔ Ep∧¬Eq ensure that we can flatten nested Es. Since S is finite it then follows that Σ(φ 0 ) is finite up to logical equivalence. P Hence there are only finitely many maximally consistent subsets of Σ(φ 0 ), so M G(φ 0 ) is certainly finite. Now pick a maximally consistent K ∈ M G(φ 0 ) with:
We need to show that such a K exists -intuitively there are no conditions on the introduced nominals n i so we can force them to name a state where χ i holds.
Lemma 3.11 The collection of formulae (i) and (ii) are consistent, hence a K ∈ M G(φ 0 ) containing them exists.
Proof. Since φ 0 is consistent we have @ t 0 φ 0 consistent via (Name) since t 0 doesn't occur in φ 0 . Now assume for a contradiction that
One can show that if θ ∨ @ i ψ where i only occurs in the single @ i , then θ ∨ Aψ -again we use the (Name) rule. We can apply this result iteratively together with propositional reasoning to obtain @ t 0 φ 0 → i (EDχ i ∧ A¬χ i ) since the n i only appear once. From EDp ∧ A¬p → ⊥ it follows that ¬@ t 0 φ 0 , contradicting the consistency of @ t 0 φ 0 . Since the formulae are consistent we can apply the Lindenbaum lemma to obtain K as a maximally consistent subset of the finite set Σ(φ 0 ). P Due to finiteness modulo logical-equivalence we can think of K as a finite set of equivalence classes and thus can write K for a finite conjunction. Having obtained this global theory K we construct another finite collection of maximally consistent sets M K : Definition 3.12 Let M(φ 0 ) be the finitely many maximally-consistent subsets of Σ(φ 0 ), then we define M K = {Φ ∈ M(φ 0 ) : K ⊆ Φ}. M K will be the carrier of our satisfying model for φ 0 . We call a finite T -model M K = (M K , γ, π) a subcanonical model if π is the canonical valuation π(v) := {Φ ∈ M K : v ∈ Φ} and evaluates nominals as singleton sets and γ : M K → T (M K ) satisfies the existence property:
For every Φ ∈ M K and all
If a subcanonical model exists then we can use it prove a truth lemma and hence obtain completeness. In fact the existence property is precisely the inductive step for modalities ♥(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) in the truth lemma, as one can check by considering the coalgebraic semantics of ♥. First we confirm that the canonical valuation is a hybrid valuation.
Lemma 3.13 The canonical valuation evaluates nominals as singleton sets
Proof. Assume Φ, Ψ ∈ M K and that we have a nominal i ∈ Φ ∩ Ψ. It then follows that ψ ∈ Φ ⇐⇒ @ i ψ ∈ Φ ⇐⇒ @ i ψ ∈ Ψ ⇐⇒ ψ ∈ Ψ. The first and last bi-implications hold because i ∧ p → @ i p is derivable and the language is closed under @-prefixing, the middle one follows because every member of M K shares the same global formulae K. P It remains to show that there exists a coalgebra structure γ satisfying the existence property. We first prove two auxiliary lemmas: Lemma 3.14 If Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 ∈ R then for any formula ψ and language substitution σ : P → F(Λ), the following rule is sound:
Proof. Let V be the collection of propositional variables that occur in Γ i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We may assume there is some clause χ containing all the variables in V which isn't equal to any Γ i , otherwise the premise is a tautology so Γ 0 and the result follows. Define the substitution τ : P → F(Λ) by τ (v) = σ(v) ∨ ¬Eψ if v occurs negatively in χ and τ (v) = σ(v) ∧ Eψ otherwise. Then every Γ i τ where i ≥ 1 contains the literal ¬Eψ and other literals take the form σ(v) or σ(v) ∧ Eψ, it follows from the premises of the above rule that for every i in {1, . . . , n} we have Γ i τ and applying our sound one-step rule we obtain Γ 0 τ . Now note that by repeated application of (MobE i ) for any modal operator ♥ and its dual ♥ it is possible to derive Ep → (♥q ↔ ♥q ), where the components q i of q may freely equal q i ∧ Ep or q i ∨ ¬Ep. Using this together with Γ 0 τ , it follows by propositional reasoning that Eψ → Γ 0 σ as required. P Lemma 3.15 Let χ ∈ Prop(P) and σ :
Proof. By induction on the structure of the propositional formula χ. We prove that ψ ∈ Σ(φ 0 ) lies in every Φ ∈ M K iff K → ψ: from left to right assume K → ψ then K ∧ ¬ψ consistent so by the Lindenbaum lemma there is some Φ ∈ M K with ψ / ∈ Φ. The other direction follows from the fact that K lies (modulo logical equivalence) in every member of M K and maximally consistent sets are closed under modus ponens. This proves the base case where χ is a propositional variable, the inductive cases for ∧ and ¬ follow by similar standard arguments. P
We are now ready to prove that a coalgebra structure satisfying the existence property [21, Lemma 28] does indeed exist.
Lemma 3.16 Suppose our ruleset R is one-step cut-free complete, then there exists a γ : M K → T M K satisfying the existence property.
Proof. For a contradiction assume γ(Φ) fails to exist as required for some Φ ∈ M K . For brevity let C = M K then the following equation holds, where we only consider those ♥(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) ∈ Σ(φ 0 ) and φ i := {Φ ∈ M K : φ i ∈ Φ}:
Let us complement this equation. Then, if we replace each ♥ ( φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) by ♥( φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) and likewise each T X \ ♥ ( φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) by ¬♥( φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) we obtain a clause ψ * , where we will now think of the subsets φ i as propositional variables. This ψ * is one-step valid with respect to (C, τ ) where τ assigns the φ thought of as propositional variables to themselves as subsets of C. By one-step cut-free completeness there exists a single rule Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 such that: (i) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} one has (C, τ ) |= Γ i τ and (ii) Γ 0 τ is a subclause of ψ * . By Lemma 3.15, (i) implies:
K → Γ i κ for 1 ≤ i ≤ n where κ is defined κ( φ ) = φ. Finally we may apply Lemma 3.14 to obtain K → Γ 0 κ, which using (ii) together with K ∈ Φ contradicts the consistency of Φ. P Consequently a subcanonical model (M K , γ * , π) exists, we can now prove a truth lemma and hence acquire completeness.
Lemma 3.17 If (M K , γ * , π) is a subcanonical model then for every maximally consistent set Φ ∈ M K and every formula ψ ∈ Σ(φ 0 ): Φ |= ψ ⇐⇒ ψ ∈ Φ Proof. The case for the boolean connectives, propositional variables and nominals is standard and the case of ♥(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) is handled by the existence property. We need only prove the case for Dχ ∈ Σ(φ 0 ), the cases for E and @ then follow via the axioms (ED) and (E@) respectively. First suppose Φ |= Dχ then there exists a distinct Ψ with Ψ |= χ so by induction χ ∈ Φ. Since Φ, Ψ distinct there is some θ in Φ but not Ψ, moreover ¬θ, χ in Ψ implies E(¬θ ∧ χ) ∈ K and hence all elements of M K . Then notice we can derive θ ∧ E(¬θ ∧ χ) → Dχ, hence Dχ in Φ as required. The converse is more difficult and makes use of the extra formulae we required K to contain. Assume Dχ ∈ Φ and first suppose Φ is named i.e. contains some nominal n. Then it follows that K ∧χ∧¬n is consistent, for the contrary together with (i) D(p∧ψ) ↔ Dp∧ψ for any global formula ψ and (ii) @ n Dχ ∈ K can be shown to contradict K's consistency.
Therefore
One can view the paper [9] , as providing a semantical characterisation of the endofunctors on Set, the coalgebras of which can be described by the standard normal modal operator P. In such cases the underlying binary relation → γ * of the coalgebra γ * above satisfies the familiar property: Pψ ∈ Φ and Φ → γ * Ψ implies ψ ∈ Ψ.
Finally, the global theory K together with any nominal is consistent, hence t 0 ∧ K is also consistent so there exists Φ 0 ∈ M K named by t 0 which contains φ 0 , so:
If R is one-step cut-free complete then R is complete and by construction we have the small model property.
Example 3.20 Minimal Relational Logic
In recent work concerning logics of preference and belief revision [7] a particular underlying logic has emerged, known as minimal relational logic. Over neighbourhood frames γ : X → PPX the following modalities are introduced:
x |= φ ⇐⇒ ∀Y ∈ γ(x).∀y ∈ Y.y |= φ x |= ¡φ ⇐⇒ ∃Y ∈ γ(x).∀y ∈ Y.y |= φ As defined in Example 2.2, neighbourhood frames are coalgebras of the functor Q • Q. Although one can define the standard neighbourhood box, neither nor ¡ arise as predicate liftings because naturality fails. As mentioned previously, although coalgebraic modal logic is rather specific about the modalities that may be defined, one can expect to be able to enrich the structure of the functor such that these modalities are definable. Consider the axiomatisation (slightly rewritten) of these operators as provided in loc. cit.:
The first two axioms tell us that has the underlying structure of a relation; note that the congruence rule for is derivable from them. Moreover the congruence rule for ¡ and the third axiom informs us that ¡ has at least the structure of a monotone neighbourhood frame. Thus we shall think of as the standard Kripke box over a relational structure and of ¡ as a monotone neighbourhood box. It is worth nothing that if R is one-step complete then the congruence rule for each modality is admissible: R φ ↔ ψ implies R ♥φ ↔ ♥ψ. They encode the fact that predicate liftings are functions.
Let us now consider the class of models where a relation and monotone neighbourhood frame are defined over the states X. The remaining axioms (iv) and (v) provide interaction between these structures, (iv) says: if our successors lie in the semantics of φ and our monotone neighbourhood contains the semantics of ψ then this neighbourhood also contains their intersection; (v) says: if the monotone neighbourhood fails to contain (i.e. it is empty) then there are no successors. By interpreting the axioms in this way we arrive at the following functor: M R : Set → Set is the subfunctor of T X = PX × MX where we restrict to objects (S, N ) ∈ T X such that (i) if N = ∅ then S = ∅ and (ii) if Y ∈ N then S ∩ Y ∈ N . That this really is a (sub)functor follows because these properties are preserved by T -coalgebra morphisms, as one can check.
Then we take as our new semantics the category of M R -coalgebras upon which the modal operators and ¡ now arise as natural transformations
These may be understood as restrictions of the standard relational and neighbourhood box respectively. Fixing our transition type M R and predicate liftings yields the following hybrid language:
One can now interpret these formulae in M R -coalgebras using the hybrid coalgebraic semantics. However one can also interpret them in the original neighbourhood semantics, via the following correspondence:
Given a neighbourhood frame γ : X → PPX define a M R -coalgebra f (γ) : X → M R X by setting f (γ)(x) = (S, N ) where S = γ(x) and N = {Y ⊆ X : ∃A ∈ γ(x).A ⊆ Y } i.e. the up-set of γ(x). Conversely given a M R -coalgebra δ : X → M R X where δ(x) = (S, N ) define the neighbourhood frame g(δ) :
Lemma 3.21 For any neighbourhood model M = (X, γ, π) its translation M = (X, f (γ), π) satisfies: ∀x ∈ X and ∀φ ∈ F(Λ), (M, x) |= φ ⇐⇒ (M , x) |= φ. The same relationship holds between M R -coalgebras M = (X, δ, π) and their translation M = (X, g(δ), π).
Proof. By induction over the structure of φ. We only consider the cases for the modal operators. Given a neighbourhood model M = (X, γ, π) let f (γ) = (S, N ).
For the second translation take a M R -model M = (X, δ, π) and let δ(x) = (S, N ) and N * = g(δ)(x).
Hence relative to the observations one can make using the hybrid formulae from F(Λ), these classes of models are identical: any neighbourhood frame can be understood as a M R -coalgebra and conversely.
One can reformulate the above axiomatisation as the following one-step ruleset, where we have written the clauses in their propositional form:
In (¡⊥), θ is either c or ¬ ¡ c, note c doesn't occur in the premise; also in all rules n ≥ 0. One can check that these are one-step sound and that they allow us to derive the axioms. In fact this collection of rules is one-step cut-free complete. In order to verify this, the reader is encouraged to show that for every set X and every ψ one-step valid relative to some τ : P → PX, there exists a single rule
with (i) (X, τ ) |= Γ 1 and (ii) Γ 0 is a subclause of ψ. Here ψ will be a clause with literals of the form a, ¬ a, ¡a or ¬ ¡ a for a ∈ P. Since this ruleset R is one-step cut-free complete, by the above theorem R is complete with respect to its hybrid coalgebraic semantics and hence also its original semantics as neighbourhood frames.
Translation, Cut Elimination and Termination
For any notion of transition T : Set → Set and coalgebraic modal operators Λ, there exists a one-step cut-free complete ruleset, see Lemma 3.8. One might think of Λ as providing a particular way of observing T -coalgebra transitions. Thus for any choice of T and Λ we can completely axiomatise their hybrid coalgebraic semantics and in particular, if we explicitly provide a one-step complete ruleset R then R provides a complete axiomatisation. We now introduce a generic sequent system, parametric in a given one-step complete ruleset R.
A sequent Γ is a multiset of @-prefixed formulae from F(Λ) where the commas should be thought of as disjunctions. In the tradition of the sequent calculus we now use capital Roman letters A, B, . . . to represent formulas in F(Λ), rather than lowercase Greek letters. We use capital Greek letters Γ, ∆, . . . for arbitrary sequents. If A ∈ F(Λ) is a clause n i=1 A i then A 1 , . . . , A n is its respective sequent. The generic sequent system consists of the following axioms and rules:
where, in rules marked by * the nominal s must occur as a subformula of the conclusion. In rules marked by + the nominal s must not occur as a subformula of the conclusion.
Definition 4.1 Suppose R is a set of one-step rules, then we define the provability predicate SR over sequents as the least set such that it:
• contains all instances of the axioms given above
• is closed under all the rules presented above
• if R ∈ R where R = Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 it is closed under its sequent translation:
where n does not occur in the conclusion, σ is an arbitrary language substitution and ∆ is an arbitrary sequent.
If one additionally closes under the standard cut rule (Cut):
Γ, A ¬A, ∆ Γ, ∆ we obtain the proof system SR+C . We will also write S or S+C , leaving the ruleset R implicit. Example 4.2 For the canonical example of the minimal normal modal logic K, the sequent translation of its one-step cut-free complete ruleset is:
where n does not occur in the conclusion, ¬A denotes ¬A 1 , . . . , ¬A m , similarly ¬PA denotes ¬PA 1 , . . . , ¬PA m and m ≥ 0.
When we attempt backwards proof-search we call our initial sequent the endsequent and any particular stage of this search a pseudo-derivation. Any maximal path from the endsequent to a leaf sequent is called a branch. If its leaf is not an axiom and there are no rules we may (backwards) apply to it we call the branch saturated.
For the fragment not containing E or D, we have shown in previous work [15] that our sequent system is complete by translating Hilbert proofs R φ 0 into proofs in our sequent system SR+C @ t φ 0 where t does not occur in φ 0 . Moreover we have also proven cut-elimination and that validity of formulae in that fragment may be checked in PSPACE. By extensions of these arguments one can show (i) cut-freeness for the full language above and (ii) termination in the absence of the difference modality. We now list various nice properties enjoyed by our system and sketch the proof of (i) and (ii).
Lemma 4.3 Various properties of S :
(i) Soundness: S Γ implies |= Γ (ii) S is closed under weakening and uniform substitution, preserving the depth of the proof (iii) Inversion lemmas (see [26] ) hold for (¬¬), (∧), (¬∧), (At), (Sd) and (Eq) (iv) One may translate a proof R φ 0 into a proof S+C @ t φ 0 where t doesn't occur in φ 0 .
Proof. (Sketch) For depth-preserving closure under uniform substitution in (ii)
it is possible that new nominals introduced in the premises of rules will need to be renamed, also (Eq) requires some manipulation. In the case of (iv) one first translates the axioms and then shows how to simulate the other rules, making use of cut, closure under weakening and the inversion lemmas. P Remark 4.4 We don't have depth-preserving inversion because we do not restrict the axiom (Ax) to propositional atoms, unlike in [26] . If we restricted (Ax) to atoms then we wouldn't be able to prove depth-preserving closure under uniform substitution, which we use to prove cut-elimination.
We prove closure under contraction and cut simultaneously. The part of the proof concerning cut-elimination is handled by requiring that R is one-step cut-free complete, however we need an additional condition on R to ensure closure under contraction, which we define in terms of the Hilbert system: Definition 4.5 The set R of one-step rules is contraction closed if, for all rules Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 and all renamings σ : P → P such that σ identifies two literals in Γ 0 (i.e. σ(a) = σ(b) and either l 1 = ♥a, l 2 = ♥b or l 1 = ¬♥a, l 2 = ¬♥b) then there exists a rule Γ 1 . . . Γ m /Γ 0 ∈ R and a renaming ρ : P → P such that ρ identifies no literals in Γ 0 and (i)
Fortunately one can always force a ruleset to be contraction closed by iteratively adding new rules [25] . In fact all the examples in Example 3.2 in addition to being one-step cut-free complete are also contraction closed. Examples where this closure is necessary include logics for multigraphs and Markov chains.
In the previous section we used one-step cut-free completeness to prove completeness. In fact we noted that one-step completeness was already enough for completeness, but chose to use the cut-free condition because we would need it later when analysing our sequent system. The following definition and lemma helps to clarify the close connection between one-step cut-free completeness and the elimination of certain special cuts.
Definition 4.6
The rule set R is cut closed if, whenever we have two rules Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 and ∆ 1 . . . ∆ k /∆ 0 and two renamings σ, ρ : P → P such that A ∈ Γ 0 σ and ¬A ∈ ∆ 0 ρ, there exists a rule Σ 1 . . . Σ l /Σ 0 and a renaming τ :
propositional tautologies where Ξ = Γ 0 σ, ∆ 0 ρ \ {A, ¬A} is the result of applying cut on A to Γ 0 σ and ∆ 0 ρ.
The underlying subject of this definition is the elimination of an application of the cut rule to the conclusions of two one-step rules. In such a situation we can assume the two one-step rules have disjoint propositional variables and modify our language substitutions accordingly. Instead of performing cuts on the conclusions, we'd like to replace the 3 rules: two substitution instances of the one-step rules φ/ψ, φ /ψ and the cut rule applied to their conclusions, by a single rule, namely a substitution instance of a one-step rule φ /ψ . In order that this doesn't break the proof we must be able to (i) use the proofs of the premises of the φ/ψ and φ /ψ substitution instances to prove the premise of the substitution instance of φ /ψ and (ii) use the conclusion of the substitution instance of φ /ψ to prove the conclusion of the cut rule. A cut closed ruleset R allows such local surgery on proofs. Proof. Suppose that Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 and ∆ 1 . . . ∆ k /∆ 0 are one-step rules and σ, ρ : P → P are renamings so that A ∈ Γ 0 σ and ¬A ∈ ∆ 0 ρ. Take C to be the set of all valuations θ : P → { , ⊥} under which all Γ i σ (i = 1, . . . , n) and all ∆ j ρ (j = 1, . . . , k) evaluate to . Define a valuation τ : P → P(C) by τ (p) = {θ ∈ C | θ(p) = }. It follows that Γ i σ (C,τ ) = ∆ j ρ (C,τ ) = C whence (T X, τ ) |= Γ 0 σ and (T X, τ ) |= ∆ 0 ρ by one-step soundness. In particular, (T X, τ ) |= Ξ for Ξ = Γ 0 σ, ∆ 0 ρ \ {¬A, A}. By one-step completeness, we can find a rule Σ 1 . . . Σ l /Σ 0 and a substitution α : P → P so that (C, τ ) |= Σ i α (i = 1, . . . , l) and Σ 0 α ⊆ Ξ is a subclause. By construction, we obtain propositional tautologies
∆ j ρ → Σ m α for all m = 1, . . . , l witnessing closure under cut. P
We can now sketch the simultaneous proof of contraction and cut-elimination.
Theorem 4.8 Let R be one-step cut-free complete and contraction closed then SR is closed under contraction and cut is eliminable
Proof. The cut-elimination proceeds via a triple induction over the modal rank of the endsequent, the depth of the proof tree and the size of the cut-formula, as was used in [15] . One shows: (i) when at least one of the premises in a cut is an axiom we may eliminate the cut (ii) when the cut formulae is not principal in at least one of its two premise then the depth of the cut in at least one of its premises can be reduced and (iii) when the cut formula is principal in both premises it may be replaced by a number of cuts, either with premises of lesser depth or using a cut formula of a smaller size.
In the critical case of (@R) whilst in case (iii), we can use cut closure via Lemma 4.7 to push the cut to the premises. However one may need to apply cuts a large number of times on these premises, hence these cuts can occur deeper in the proof. Thankfully, due to the structure of one-step rules, the cut formulae in such cuts have a strictly smaller modal rank and thus may be eliminated via the triple induction. Also proving contraction is mostly straightforward via the invertibility lemmas, however the (@R) rules require special attention when the contraction occurs principally. In such cases we apply contraction closure of R, again this will require propositional reasoning via cut amongst premises but as before the cut-formulae all have strictly smaller rank and hence are eliminated by the triple induction. P One can check that principal cuts using the new rules (E) and (¬E) and similarly (D) and (¬D) are eliminable, the other additional cases introduced by these new rules are standard. In these cases depth-preserving closure under uniform substitution (of nominals) is required.
We provide an example proof of the axiom Qp → p ∨ Dp in the sequent system SR , where we use the ruleset for the minimal normal modal logic K. In our system a → b and Qa are defined connectives ¬a ∨ b and ¬P¬a respectively. Thus after rewriting and prefixing by @ t we obtain @ t (¬¬P¬p ∨ (p ∨ Dp)):
Before providing restrictions on proof-search ensuring termination in the absence of the difference modality, we must introduce auxiliary concepts from [2, 3] .
Definition 4.9
(i) Along any branch Θ of a pseudo-derivation one can define a nominal tree i.e. a partial order < Θ defined over the nominals that occur in Θ. Set t < Θ n if there exists an (@R) rule in Θ where t is the principal nominal in the conclusion and n is the principal nominal in the premise. One then takes the transitive closure.
(ii) Along any branch Θ one defines another partial order ⊆ Θ on the nominals that occur on any branch Θ by: i ⊆ Θ j iff for every formula @ i ψ that occurs in Θ, @ j ψ also occurs on Θ.
The terminating proof-search strategy is provided in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.10 Every provable sequent Γ ∈ S(Λ) that doesn't mention the difference modality has a proof where (i) the (¬E) rule may only be applied once and (ii) along every branch Θ the rules (@R) and (E):
• may only be applied to the same principal subsequent once
• are only applied to maximal nominals in the ⊆ Θ ordering Under these restrictions, every branch that can be constructed by backwards application of proof rules is finite, i.e. proof search in this restricted system is terminating.
Proof. (Sketch) We have a pseudo-subformulae property: any @ i ψ occurring in the proof search has ψ ≡ χ[
where χ is a possibly negated subformula of the endsequent and every i r , j r is a nominal in the endsequent. This may be proved by induction over the proof system and establishes that there are at most finitely many formulae that can occur under any particular satisfaction operator @ i . The rule (¬E) only ever needs to be applied once. If we flip the rules and view the sequent system as a tableau, then this rule asserts the existence of a state where a formula holds and we need only create one such state. Next, along any branch Θ we only apply the rules (@R) and (E) to the maximal nominals on the branch relative to the ordering ⊆ Θ . This technique is often referred to in the literature as loop-checking. It can be shown to preserve completeness and moreover ensures that the nominal tree has finite depth -for if not one acquires a contradiction via the pseudo-subformulae property [3] .
Finally in order to ensure that the nominal tree along our arbitrary branch Θ is finite, we must also show that it is finitely branching. One can show that along Θ, (@R) and (E) need only ever be applied to a particular subsequent once. Given a proof where they occur twice along Θ, one may manipulate said proof to remove the duplicate occurrence. Again applying the pseudo-subformulae property it follows that any particular nominal may only branch finitely many times via (@R). Since it follows that the nominal tree < Θ along any branch Θ is finite we obtain termination. P Semantically, if we wish to construct the underlying frame of a saturated branch Θ, we would take the nominal tree < Θ and quotient it under the reflexive-transitive closure of the relation: Rij ⇐⇒ @ i ¬j ∈ Θ or @ j ¬i ∈ Θ. In order to find the coalgebra structure over it one considers not only the formulae @ i p, @ i ¬p ∈ Θ, which provide us with the propositional valuation, but also the boxed formulae @ i ♥(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ), ¬♥(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) ∈ Θ which define the transition structure. We leave a more explicit description of its construction until another time, it essentially generalises the shallow model construction presented in [25] . All the rulesets presented in this paper are one-step cut-free complete. We invite the reader to ensure their contraction closure, construct their sequent translation and then attempt to prove the negation @ t ¬φ 0 of some known satisfiable formula φ 0 . One should be able to decode a model from a saturated branch.
Compositionality by Example
In Section 2, we have introduced a T -coalgebra as a pair (C, γ) where C is a set and γ : C → T C is a (transition) function. Clearly this definition is parametric in the endofunctor T : Set → Set that defines the type of transitions, and we have described a general setup for logics interpreted over T -coalgebras. In particular, this level of generality allows us to consider composition of (type) functors without leaving the coalgebraic framework: given two functors S, T : Set → Set, we can of course consider S • T -coalgebras (C, γ : C → S(T (C))). It is best to think of S • Tcoalgebras as describing sequencing of two transition types. If, say, T X is the set of finitely supported probability distributions over the set X and SY are the possible outcomes of one round of a strategic game with board Y , we may conceive S • Tcoalgebras as models of stragetic games with uncertainty, as we see not outcomes of strategic games, but rather probability distributions over possible outcomes. Given that we know how to construct a modal logic for both ingedients (probabilities and strategic games) separately, it is of course legitimate to ask how this can be used to obtain a logic for games with uncertainty.
This question has been studied both from a logical and algorithmic perspective [5, 23] where complete Hilbert-style proof systems and decision procedures, respectively, are synthesised, but hybrid extensions are not taken into account.
On the other hand, the only ingredient that is necessary to obtain complete and terminating sequent systems is a one-step cut-free axiomatisation. In other words, if we construct a one-step cut-free axiomatisation of S • T -coalgebras from an axiomatisation of the ingredients, completeness and termination, even in presence of hybrid features, are automatic. Rather than (re-)developing a theory of compositionality for coalgebraic logics, we present an extended example that shows how a logic for strategic games can be extended to cover quantitative uncertainty.
Throughout the section, we fix a set A of agents, or players in a strategic game, and write
for the set of finitely supported probability distributions over a set X. The set of outcomes of strategic games over a set Y of positions is denoted by
where we think of S a as the set of strategies avaliable to each agent a ∈ A, and of f : a∈A S a → X as an outcome function that delivers a new state of the game board, given a choice of strategy by every agent.
It is straightforward to extend both D and G to functors of type Set → Set. This allows us to model strategic games as coalgebras (C, γ : C → GC) where each position c ∈ C of the game board comes equipped with a set of strategies for the individual agent, and a function that delivers a new state of the board. Using functor coposition, strategic games with uncertain outcomes can now be modelled as G •D-coalgebras (C, γ : C → G •D(C)). Spelling out the definitions, the transition map γ associates with every state c ∈ C (which we think of as a position in a strategic game) a family (S a ) a∈A of available strategies and a probabilitydistribution valued outcome function f : a∈A S a → D(C). As a consequence, we only have probabilistic knowledge about the next state of the game board.
From the perspective of the individual logics, we use Pauly's coalition logic [20] which has modal operators operators [C] for every subset (thought of as a coalition) of agents, where we read [C]φ as "coalition C has a collaborative strategy to achieve φ". Interpreted over game frames, i.e. G-coalgebras, this semantics comes about by the predicate liftings
that expresses the existence of a choice of strategies of the agents in C such that -irrespective of the choices of the other agents -the position assigned by the outcome function will lie in the set H (of positions). We note that coalition logic can be equipped with a one-step cut-free aximatisation [17] , the precise form of which is inconsequential for our present purpose.
For probabilistic modal logic, we choose the modal operators L p (for p ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q) with the reading "with probability at least . . . . Interpreted over probabilistic frames, that is, D-coalgebras, the semantics of probabilistic modal logic is then induced by the predicate liftings
Again, we refrain from spelling out a one-step cut-free complete axiomatisation which is readily adapted from what is called strictly one-step complete in [25] by replacing rule premises with their conjunctive normal form. We now turn to the combination of both logical features, interpreted over probabilistic game frames, construed as G • D-coalgebras. Every application of the transition function of a G • D-coalgebra provides us with strategies and a probability distribution-valued outcome function. Syntactically, this insinuates that we should speak about G • Dcoalgebras using operators that are built from an outermost coalitional operator that uses operators from probabilistic modal logic to describe the uncertainty embodied by the outcome function. For instance, the formula
describes the situation where coalition C has a strategy to achieve an outcome A with a probability between p and q inclusive. As this example shows, we generally need propositional combinations of probabilistic operators to be able to specify enough detail about the (probabilistic) outcome function.
In our example, a modal operator for games with uncertainty therefore consists of an outermost modality of coalition logic, applied to a propositional combination of probabilistic operators. The general definition is as follows:
Definition 5.1 Suppose that Λ, Σ are modal similarity types. The propositional combination Λ • Σ contains the k-ary operators
where ♥ ∈ Λ is n-ary and Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n ∈ Prop(Σ({p 1 , . . . , p k })) for all k ≥ 0.
The propositional combination of two structures T and U for Λ and Σ, respectively, consists of the endofunctor T • S, together with the predicate liftings
where τ : V → P(X) is the valuation p i → A i .
This formalises that a modality type of the similarity type Λ • Σ consists of an outermost Λ-modality, applied to a propositional combination of Σ-modalities. We obtain a Λ • Σ-structure by composing the associated endofunctors, where the predicate liftings arise by applying the interpretation of the outermost lifting ♥ , evaluated at U X, to the one-step semantics Φ i T X,τ of Φ i with respect to U . Note that ♥ U X is a mapping of type P(U X) n → P(T U X) and Φ i U X,τ ⊆ U X.
We remark that the ensuing hybrid language can alternatively be constructed using a two-sorted approach that distinguishes between coalitional and probabilistic states. This approach has been followed in [5, 23] for the case without hybrid extensions, which requires slightly more technical machinery and breaks the symmetry between (in this case) probabilistic and coalitional operators, as e.g. nominals and satisfaction operators can only be used on the level of coalitional operators.
Completeness and cut-elimination for the hybrid logic of games with uncertainty now hinge on the availability of a one-step cut-free complete rule set that we now set out to construct. Intuitively, to establish a sequent [C 1 ]Φ 1 , . . . , [C k ]Φ k we first apply a rule of coalition logic to obtain premises in terms of Φ 1 , . . . , Φ k , followed by propositional rules to de-construct the Φ i before we can apply a probabilistic rule. Here, the de-construction of a propositional formula is a set of atomic sequents that suffice to establish the formula in the sequent calculus -this process is usually called saturation, and introduced next.
Definition 5.2
The saturation sat(Γ) ⊆ P(W ∪ ¬W ) of a set Γ ⊆ Prop(W ) of propositional formulas over a set W of atoms is given by
where ∆ is inconsistent, if {¬w, w} ⊆ ∆ for some w ∈ W .
It is straightforward to see that saturation is actually well-defined, and moreover preserves and reflects validity.
Lemma 5.3 Suppose Γ ⊆ Prop(W ) is finite. Then sat(Γ) is well-defined. Moreover, if X is a set and τ : P → P(X) is a valuation, we have X, τ |= Γ iff X, τ |= ∆ for all ∆ ∈ sat(Γ).
Proof. Well-definedness follows as application of different clauses of the propositional deconstruction distribute over one another and eliminate at least one propositional connective. The second statement follows by inspecting the different clauses in the definition of propositional deconstruction. P
We can now define the composition of rule sets by interspersing propositional reasoning within rule applications. The presentation of the combination of rule sets benefits from the following notation. If X is a set and Ψ, Ψ ⊆ P(X ∪ ¬X), we put Ψ Ψ if there exists a surjection e : Ψ → Ψ such that Γ ⊆ e(Γ) for all Γ ∈ Ψ. In other words, Ψ arises from Ψ by weakening each of the clauses contained in Ψ. We write Wk(Ψ) = {Ψ | Ψ Ψ for the set of all possible weakenings of Ψ.
Definition 5.4 If R and S are sets of one-step rules over similarity types Λ and Σ, respectively, their composition R • S contains all rules
where σ 1 , . . . , σ n : V → V and τ : V → Prop(Σ(V )) are substitutions, for which we can find rules
In other words, the saturation of a set of propositional formulas arises by applying propositional sequent rules backwards until the level of atoms is reached. The composition of two rule sets comes about by first applying an R-rule to the conclusion, deconstructing the premises via propositional sequent rules, and then applying an S-rule, and possibly an instance of weakening, to each remaining sequent. The intermediate weakening step mirrors the fact that -for cut-free complete rule sets -the conclusion is only required to be a subset of the sequent under consideration. Put differently, we use propositional reasoning, combined with weakening, to provide the glue between both rule sets.
It is easy to see that this construction preserves one-step soundness.
Proposition 5.5 Suppose that R and S are sets of one-step rules over similarity types Λ and Σ, respectively. If R and S are one-step sound with respect to structures T and U , respectively, then R • S is one-step sound for T • U .
Proof. Consider the rule ∆ 1 1 σ 1 , . . . , ∆ 1
. . , ∆ n kn σ n /Γ 0 τ and suppose that we can find rules
. . n and a rule Γ 1 , . . . , Γ k /Γ 0 as required in the definition of R • S. Assume we have renamings σ i : V → V and a substitution τ : V → Prop(Σ(V )) as required by the definition. Now let X be a set and ρ : V → P(X) a valuation such that X, ρ |= ∆ j i σ i for all i = 1, . . . , n and all j = 1, . . . , k i . By one-step soundness of S, this entails that U X, ρ |= ∆ i 0 σ i . This entails that U X, ρ |= Σ for all Σ ∈ sat(Γ 1 τ ) ∪ · · · ∪ sat(Γ k τ ). By Lemma 5.3 we obtain U X, ρ |= Γ i τ for all i = 1, . . . , k. Applying one-step soundness of R at the set Y = U X establishes the claim. P
Crucially, this construction preserves one-step cut-free completeness.
Proposition 5.6 Suppose R and S are one-step rules over similarity types Λ and Σ, respectively. If R and S are one-step cut-free complete with respect to structures T and U , respectively, then R • S is one-step cut-free complete with respect to T • U .
where i stands for either nothing or negation, the Φ i are tuples of propositional formulas over Σ(V ) according to the arity of ♥ i and p i are tuples of propositional variables according to the arity of ♥ i (Φ i ) for all i = 1, . . . , k. Now assume that We have shown that all premises ∆ ∆ i are valid with respect to X, τ and have Γ 0 ρθ ⊆ Γ by construction, hence r witnesses one-step cut-free completeness of R • S. P As a consequence, the scope of our method extends to logics that arise as combinations of two similarity types, each of which is equipped with coalgebraic semantics. While it is in general infeasible to construct one-step cut-free axiomatisations for a combination of logics from given rule sets by hand, this process is readily performed algorithmically: given a representation of a cut-free axiomatisation of rule sets R and S, we can construct a representation of R • S. What we have in mind is the following:
Definition 5.7 Suppose that R is a set of one-step rules over a modal similarity type Λ. A representation of R is a set-indexed collection of function In other words, a representation of R is a function that -given a set of Λ-prefixed formulas -returns the set of all substituted rule conclusions with premise Γ -which is precisely what we need if we were to implement backward proof search. We think of a representation as a polymorphic function that can be applied independently of the nature of formulas to which Λ-modalities are applied. As a first sanity check, we show that this definition of representation indeed yields a polymorphic family of functions, that is to say that representations are stable under injective renamings. In categorical terms, this amounts to representations being natural transformations of type Λ → P • P where both Λ and P are functors on the category of sets with injective functions.
Lemma 5.8 Suppose ρ : S → S is an injective function and f is a representation of a set R of one-step rules. If Λ(ρ) : Λ(S)∪¬Λ(S) → Λ(S )∪¬Λ(S ) is the mapping defined by ♥(s 1 , . . . , s n ) → ♥(ρ(s 1 ), . . . , ρ(s n )) then f S • Λ(ρ) = PP(f ) • f S where P(f ) denotes taking direct image.
Proof. Let Ψ ∈ PPf • f S (Γ) for some Γ ⊆ Λ(S) ∪ ¬Λ(S). Then there exists a rule Γ 1 . . . Γ n Γ 0 ∈ R and a renaming σ : P → S such that Γ 0 σ = Γ and Ψ = {Pf (Γ 1 σ) , . . . , Pf (Γ n σ)}.
To show that Ψ ∈ f S • Λ(f )(Γ) we use the same rule with substitution σ = f • σ. Now let Ψ ∈ f S • Λ(f )(Γ). In this case, we again have a rule Γ 0 /Γ 1 . . . Γ n ∈ R and a subsitution σ : P → S such that Γ 0 σ = Λ(f )(Γ) and Ψ = {Γ 1 σ , . . . , Γ n σ }.
Since f is assumed to be injective, there's a one-sided inverse f : S → S such that f • f is the identity on S. Note that -by virtue of Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 being a one-step rule -all literals that occur in one of the Γ i σ (i = 1, . . . , n) also occur in Λ(f )(Γ) and are hence in the image of f . We can therefore pick the same rule, together with the substitution σ = f • σ to witness that Ψ ∈ PP(f ) • f S (Γ). P
We note for the categorically minded reader that, in general, representations as defined above fail to be natural unless the category of sets is equipped with injective maps. This reflects the fact that we do not make any assumptions on the rule sets under scrutiny, and requiring naturality also for non-injective maps would amount to requiring that rule sets absorb contraction in a stronger sense than required in Definition 4.5: for all rules and substitutions that duplicate literals in the conclusion, there exists a new rule/substitution pair with stronger conclusion and weaker premise (in the sense of the subset relation). Definition 4.5 only requires this up to propositional reasoning. Rule sets satisfying this (stronger) property essentially allow us to eliminate contraction independently of cut. This viewpoint is taken, for the case of modal logic without hybrid features, in [19] . In the light of constructing rule sets for logics that arise as the composition of two sets of one-step rules, we can now use the above notion of representation to synthesise a representation of combined rule sets, in terms of their constituents. In other words, we can synthesise a representation of a rule set that axiomatises the combination of two logics in terms of the individual rule sets so that cut-free completeness is preserved (see Proposition 5.6). The proof of the preeeding proposition is a straightforward unfolding of Definition 5.4 and left to the reader.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that Bolander's method [3, 2] of proving completeness for hybrid tableaux extends to modal logics way beyond those amenable to relational semantics. Our main results are soundness, completeness for both a Hilbert-style and a Sequent calculus for hybrid extensions of coalgebraic logic, and we have established termination of proof search for the fragment without the difference modality. We leave a termination analysis for the full hybrid logics, including the difference modality, for future work. To emphasise the generality of our method, we have given a single-sorted analysis of compositionality orthogonal to the method presented in [23] .
